Collaboration and Its Limits: Axis Partnerships in Emerging Technologies
April 2026
This briefing paper commissioned by a government department examines a question that has become harder to ignore since 2022: what exactly are China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea able to do together in emerging technologies? The short answer is that there is more coordination here than comfortable Western analysis sometimes assumes, but rather less than some of the more excitable commentary suggests. Across quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, and robotics, serious partnerships exist. They are trategically motivated, and occasionally consequential. But they are also deeply uneven.
The paper argues that the most striking pattern is not so much seamless technological integration, but asymmetrical cooperation shaped by mistrust, capability gaps, and diverging strategic priorities. China sits at the centre of this landscape as the only actor with something approaching full-spectrum capacity in the relevant domains. Russia, Iran, and North Korea can contribute operational experience, niche capabilities, clever sanctions workarounds, and selective military applications, but none can simply plug into a unified authoritarian innovation bloc and produce frictionless joint capability. In quantum technologies especially, the barriers remain severe. In AI and autonomous systems, cooperation is more feasible, but still narrower and more transactional than the language of a fully consolidated “axis” might imply.
The broader implication is one of seriousness without getting too dramatic. These partnerships deserve close attention, particularly where they generate concrete military or surveillance advantages, but their limitations matter too. The challenge is probably not an omnipotent technological coalition on the horizon. It is a much looser and more opportunistic configuration whose weaknesses are as strategically significant as its areas of progress.